The One Question Not Open to Discussion

 

“Holding to principle comes before obeying democratic procedure.” — The Commander’s Confessions, pp. 140–141

The Red Shirt Movement was an open movement. Leading figures from every field flocked to it — some took part publicly, others offered counsel privately; writers and cultural figures, creative professionals, poets, artists, and entrepreneurs were all part of it. Shih Ming Te said he received everyone’s full support and gave back selflessly to every friend who took part.

 

Only one matter, from beginning to end, he would not open for discussion.

 

Should they storm the Presidential Office?

 

He was candid about his reasons. Had it been put up for discussion, he would not necessarily have been in the majority. Even if the “peaceful line” were upheld in principle, a “brink-of-violence” approach or something close to it might well have replaced the original conclusion — and such alternatives would in the end have eroded the principle of peace itself.

 

So he did not put it to a vote. On October 10, the day of the Nationwide Siege, many people had their own ideas, and some prominent figures were already prepared to charge in. He knew that this question could not even be discussed; it had to be decided by him alone.

 

The leader of a democratic movement refusing to use democratic procedure — this requires explanation.

 

His explanation was that truth is not necessarily the majority. Truth often begins as a minority and becomes the majority only as it is gradually accepted; and many times the majority goes hand in hand with violence, and when calculations of public and private interest are added, all the more wisdom is needed to weigh it.

 

As for why they could not go in, he gave five reasons.

 

First, he had made a pact of peace and non-violence with a million people; he could not let ambition flare up just because their strength had grown and their fists were bigger. Seventy percent of the Red Shirts were women and young mothers; charging in would surely mean bloodshed. The Bank of Taiwan stood right next door, and looting amid the chaos could quickly spiral out of control.

 

Second, Taiwan had not had a coup in sixty years, and its system of elected government was established. Charging in would be a coup. Pandora’s box must not be opened — once opened, Taiwan might have coups every so often. He had contributed to building democratic institutions; he could not strangle this newborn democracy with his own hands.

 

Third, even if they captured Chen Shui-bian, under Article 52 of the Constitution the president is not subject to criminal prosecution except for rebellion or treason, and the courts would have to release him. If he were not released, the only way would be to set up a “revolutionary tribunal” — which would equally be a coup, rendering the Legislative Yuan, the Executive Yuan, and the Judicial Yuan all void.

 

Fourth, when two forces confront each other, the stronger side does not necessarily win. He judged that the other side might deliberately leave the city empty, letting the Red Shirts storm in only to find no one to seize. And if Chen Shui-bian fought like a cornered beast, went south and declared martial law, civil war would break out. A still more ruthless move would be to declare Taiwan independence unilaterally, using an external crisis to defuse his internal one and turning the fight against corruption entirely into a battle over unification and independence.

 

Fifth, if there really were internal turmoil, would it give China an opening?

 

On October 10, the column reached the intersection. To the west, they would certainly seize the Presidential Office; to the east, a bloody clash would be avoided. He led the column east.

 

Three years later, he wrote in court: at the critical moment, on the critical question, only the leader himself can decide.

 

This is the hardest lesson the Red Shirts left behind. It proved that whether democratic institutions hold may sometimes depend on whether, at the most critical moment, someone is willing not to follow democratic procedure — and to bear twenty years of being called “a tiger’s head and a snake’s tail” for it.

October 10, 2006, the Nationwide Siege. The commander-in-chief leads the column east.

Source: Shih Ming Te, The Commander’s Confessions, 2009, pp. 50–53, 126–131, 140–141. The quotation is from “Note 2: The Role of the ‘Commander-in-Chief,’” supplementary statement dated January 10, 2009.

Want to learn more about the Red Shirt Movement and the innermost confessions of its commander-in-chief, Shih Ming Te?

Click here to read more about The Commander’s Confessions and get your copy.

On September 9, 2026, the Shih Ming Te Foundation will host the International Symposium on Civil Society, Democratic Resilience, and National Security: Twenty Years After Taiwan’s Anti-Corruption Red Shirt Movement.

A free, democratic, and open society is the value we hold fast to — and also our own vulnerability.

How to hold fast to these values and defend our way of life is the greatest challenge before us now.

 

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